Abstract. Opacity is a general behavioural security scheme flexible enough to account for several specific properties. Some secret set of behaviors of a system is opaque if a passive attacker can never tell whether the observed behavior is a secret one or not. Instead of considering the case of static observability where the set of observable events is fixed off-line or dynamic observability where the set of observable events changes over time depending on the history of the trace, we consider Orwellian partial observability where unobservable events are not revealed unless a downgrading event occurs in the future of the trace. We show how to verify that some regular secret is opaque for a regular language L w.r.t. an Orwellian projection while it has been proved undecidable even for a regular language L w.r.t. a general Orwellian observation function. We finally illustrate relevancy of our results by proving the equivalence between the opacity property of regular secrets w.r.t. Orwellian projection and the intransitive non-interference property.
Introduction
Motivations Opacity has been introduced in [1] in the context of security protocols and adapted to transition systems in [2] . Opacity is a very general security property scheme parametrized by a predicate on system executions (the secret) and an equivalence relation on system executions characterizing the intruder's observation capabilities (each equivalence class corresponds to an observable from the environment). The secret is opaque with respect to an observation relation if any observation class containing a run in the secret, contains also a run that is not in the secret in such a way that an intruder observing the behavior of a system according to the observation relation cannot guarantee to infer from this observation whether the observed trace belongs to the secret or not. By adjusting its parameters, opacity can be instantiated to a large class of security or information flow properties (confidentiality, anonymity, non-interference) ( [2, 3] ). Observation can be classified as static, dynamic and Orwellian depending on the computational power of an observer that it reflects. An observation relation that is static is defined a priori reflecting an observer who always interprets the same event in the same way. Dynamic observation is prefix-based and corresponds to observers able to deduce knowledge from previous events to interpret the current one that is to each prefix correspond and interpretation of the current action. Orwellian observation is trace-based and depends at any time not only upon the trace prefix but also upon the trace suffix reflecting observers able to use subsequent knowledge to re-interpret events. Orwellian observation is required to instantiate opacity to security policies dealing, for instance, with mechanisms for declassifying or downgrading information. The problem of opacity w.r.t. Orwellian observation is known to be undecidable even for finite transition systems and a degenerated form of opacity [2] . Our aim is to define a class of Orwellian observation relations expressive enough to express most of declassification policies like, for instance, intransitive non-interference, when instantiating opacity to observation relations in this class, while rendering decidable the problem of opacity of regular secrets w.r.t. this class for finite transition systems.
Contributions Our contributions are related to the study of opacity under a class of Orwellian observation relations that we called Orwellian projections and its relation to intransitive non-interference. An Orwellian projection π o,d is a natural projection of a sequence of events Σ * on observable events Σ * o unless a downgrading event in Σ d occurs subsequently. In this case, the prefix up to this downgrading event is left invariant by π o,d . Our contributions are twofold: first, they provide solutions to the verification problem for opacity w.r.t. π o,d and second, they relate opacity w.r.t. π o,d to another concept used in the formal security community namely, intransitive non-interference (INI).
Concerning the verification problem, our first contribution is a language-theoretic characterization of opacity w.r.t. π o,d in terms of opacity w.r.t. natural projections (Theorem 1). It has to be noted that this characterization is not in itself an effective procedure since opacity verification w.r.t. π o,d is reduced to an infinite number of verifications of opacity w.r.t. natural projections. The first step toward an algorithm, our main contribution to the verification problem (Theorem 2), is based on Theorem 1 and the construction of a transition system incorporating the regular secret together with the finite transition system modeling the original system. Opacity verification w.r.t. π o,d is then reduced to the verification of opacity of, in the worst case, N regular secrets w.r.t. natural projections for N finite transition systems where N is the number of downgrading transitions of the original system.
Lastly, as an application that illustrates the relevancy of the notion of opacity w.r.t. Orwellian projections, we show that opacity of regular secrets w.r.t. Orwellian projection and intransitive non-interference are reducible to each other (Theorems 4 and 5). In order to prove this, we prove, as a building block, such a characterization of opacity of regular languages w.r.t. natural projections and non-interference (Theorem 3), generalizing, as a side effect, a similar result obtained in [2] for a degenerated form of opacity and non-interference.
Related work Algorithms for verifying opacity in Discrete Event Systems w.r.t. projections are presented together with applications in [4, 5, 6, 3] . In [4] , the authors consider a concurrent version of opacity and show that it is decidable for regular systems and secrets. In [5] , the authors define what they called secrecy and provide algorithms for verifying this property. A system property satisfies secrecy if the property and its negation are state-based opaque. In [3] the author provides an algorithm for verifying state-based opacity (called strong opacity) and shows how opacity can be instantiated to important security properties in computer systems and communication protocols, namely anonymity and secrecy. In [6] , the authors define the notion of K-step opacity where the system remains state-based opaque in any step up to depth-k observations that is, any observation disclosing the secret has a length greater than k. Two methods are proposed for verifying K-step opacity. In [7] , the authors introduce dynamic projections where the set of events the user can observe changes over time and show how to check that a system is opaque w.r.t. that class of dynamic observation functions.
Non-interference (NI) and intransitive non-interference (INI) for deterministic Mealy machines have been defined in [8] . In [9] , an algorithm is provided for INI. A formulation of INI within the context of non-deterministic LTSs is given in [10] , in the form of a property called admissible interference (AI), which is verified by reduction to the verification of a stronger version than NI called strong non-deterministic non-interference (SNNI) in [11] of N finite transition systems where N is the number of downgrading transitions of the original system. It coincides with INI in the case of deterministic LTS. In [12] , various notions of INI properties are considered and compared but no comparison with Rushby's original definition is provided. In [13] , the observability theory of discrete event systems is used to formulate and provide an algorithmic approach to the INI verification problem. In [14] , the author has argued that Rushby's definition of security for intransitive policies that corresponds roughly to our notion of Orwellian projection suffers from some flaws, and proposed some stronger variations in the context of deterministic Mealy machines. In [15] , the authors reformulate Rushby's definition in the setting of deterministic LTSs. Verification is then reduced to the verification of an equivalent characterization to SNNI called strong non-deducibility on compositions (SNDC) in [11] of N finite transition systems where N is the number of high-level transitions in the original system.
Paper organization The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents some preliminaries in labeled transition systems and opacity. In Section 3, we define and provide a verification algorithm of with respect to Orwellian projections. Finally, in section 4 we show the equivalence between the opacity problem w.r.t. Orwellian projections and intransitive non-interference.
Opacity in Transition Systems

Labeled transition systems and their languages
A finite deterministic labeled transition system over Σ is a 4-tuple G = (Σ, Q, δ, q 0 ), where Σ denotes the alphabet of events, Q denotes the state space, δ is a partial function from Q × Σ to Q, called labeled transition function and q 0 the initial state. The partial function δ is naturally extended to a partial function δ : Q × Σ * → Q defined recursively on strings in Σ * as follows: δ(q, ǫ) = q and δ(q, s · α) = δ(δ(q, s), α) where ǫ denotes the empty word and, given s, s
{s} · L will be simply denoted by s · L. In the sequel we let s −1 L denote the left quotient of L by s that is, the set {t ∈ Σ * : s · t ∈ L} and L denote the prefix-closure of L that is, the set {s ∈ Σ * : ∃t ∈ Σ * s.t. s · t ∈ L}. The language of G = (Σ, Q, δ, q 0 ) is the set of words
For F ⊆ Q, the set of words recognized by states in F is defined as L F (G) = {s ∈ Σ * : δ(q 0 , s) ∈ F }.
Opacity
We consider a language L ⊆ Σ * modelling the behavior of a system and Σ o ⊆ Σ. Opacity qualifies a predicate ϕ, given as a subset of L, with respect to an observation function O from Σ * onto set Σ * o of observables modelling user capabilities for observing the system. Two strings s and s ′ of L are equivalent w.r.t. O if they produce the same observable:
The information flow deduced by the attacker when the system is not opaque is captured by the notion of secret disclosure. Natural projections provide a class of static observation functions. Given a language
In the sequel we will denote [s]
. As ϕ and L are regular, L\ϕ is regular and since π o is a morphism and images under morphisms of regular languages are regular, this relation can be decided. 
t. Orwellian projections
In this section we consider a class of Orwellian observation functions that we call Orwellian projections. Throughout this section, we will consider languages over an alphabet Σ partitioned into three sub-alphabets Σ o , Σ u and Σ d . Σ o is a set of observable events, Σ u a set of unobservable events unless a downgrading event in Σ d occurs.
Opacity generalized to Orwellian projections
We now define the notion of Orwellian projection.
In the sequel we denote [s]
* and L ⊆ Σ * in order to simplify the notation.
An illustration of the expressiveness of Orwellian projections to model information declassification or intransitive information flow arising when downgrading information is provided in the following example.
Example 2. Consider the automaton G 2 given in Figure 2 with the set
. Consider now a secret described by the language ϕ = {hl} ∪ {hdhl}{l} * . We can check easily that [hl]
Hence ϕ is not opaque for L w.r.t. π o,d because hl is the only trace that can be observed as l and hl is in the secret. Consequently, hl discloses the secret ϕ. Moreover, as the first h has been revealed by downgrading in hdl and any trace in hdhll * , hdhll n , for n ∈ N, is the only trace to be observed as hdll n and hdhll n is in the secret. Hence hdhll n discloses the secret also for n ∈ N. Let us define the smallest set containing the empty string and prefixes in L ending with a downgrading event:
and for each s ∈ D(L), its continuation in (Σ\Σ d ) * :
The following result derives directly:
Then any u ∈ L admits a unique factorization u = st such that s ∈ D(L) and t ∈ C(s, L). In this factorization, s is the longest prefix of L terminating with a d ∈ Σ d .
Remark 2. Note that for any s ∈ D(L), and t
(the reverse inclusion is obvious), linking in that way the Orwellian projection π o,d and the static projection π o .
The following theorem reduces opacity disclosure w.r.t. π o,d to opacity disclosure w.r.t. 
As s 0 t 0 ∈ ϕ we have,
Consequently, 
To prove the result, we will show that u 0 discloses the secret
Checking opacity of regular secrets w.r.t. Orwellian projections
The verification procedure is based on a product where the secret is incorporated into the transition system. Let a finite LTS G = (Σ, Q, δ, q 0 ) and F ⊆ Q s.t. L F (G) = L and a regular secret ϕ ⊆ Σ * that we can consider w.l.o.g. included in L (otherwise one takes L ∩ ϕ as secret). First, one constructs a complete deterministic transition system
Example 3. Consider the automaton G 2 = (Σ, Q, δ, q 0 ) of Example 2 in Figure 2 with L = L(G 2 ) and ϕ = {hl} ∪ {hdhl}{l} * . Taking G 2ϕ as the complete deterministic automaton depicted in Figure 3 with F ϕ = {3, 7}, we get that G 2# = G 2 , F # = Q and F ϕ # = {3, 7} as depicted in Figure 4 . Hence, in the rest of this paper and w.l.o.g., we assume that
We are now ready for the verification result establishing, as a consequence, the decidability of the opacity verification problem w.r.t. π o,d of regular secrets for regular languages.
Proof. Suppose that ϕ is not opaque for L w.r.t. π o,d then, by Theorem 1, for some s 0 ∈ D(ϕ) and t 0 ∈ C(s 0 , ϕ), t 0 discloses the secret
Example 4. Consider again the LTS G 2 = (Σ, Q, δ, q 0 ) of Example 2 in Figure 2 with L = L(G 2 ) and ϕ = {hl} ∪ {hdhl}{l} * . In this case,
\ {d} is not opaque w.r.t. π o since hl discloses the secret. This reflects the case where there is no downgrading along the run (Figure 5(a) ). But this is also the case that G 4 2 \ {d} is not opaque w.r.t. π o since any sequence in hll * discloses the secret after downgrading. This reflects that sequences in hdhll * discloses the secret w.r.t. π o,d ( Figure 5(b) ). 
Definition 4. Let a LTS
For intransitive non-interference, Σ is partitioned into three sets High (private actions), Low (public actions) and Down (downgrading actions). A system is intransitive non-interferent if it non-interferent unless a downgrading action occurs and discloses all private actions encountered so far. A discussion on intransitive non-interference can be found in [8, 12] and [14] .
The following result reduces the INI verification problem to N instances of the NI verification problem where N is the number of downgrading transitions in G.
Proposition 3. Let a LTS
This result restates in a language-theoretic setting, a result due to [10] . As a first result in this section, with the aim to build a reduction from opacity of regular secrets w.r.t. an Orwellian projection to INI, we extend a result due to [2] and reducing a degenerated form of opacity w.r.t. natural projection to NI.
Theorem 3. The opacity verification problem of regular secrets w.r.t. π o for regular languages is reducible to the NI verification problem for finite systems.
Proof. Let G = (Σ, Q, δ, q 0 ) be a transition system and F,
Now, we consider a non-interference problem for G ♭ with the following partitioning: Low = Σ o ∪ {ǫ} and High = {h} and finally, we show that ϕ is opaque for L w.r.t.
⇐=: Suppose that ϕ is not opaque for L w.r.t. π o then for some s 0 ∈ L, s 0 dis-
Now, we build a reduction of opacity w.r.t. an Orwellian projection to INI by using the previous reduction as building blocks: Proof. Let G = (Σ, Q, δ, q 0 ) be a transition system and F,
Now, we consider an intransitive non-interference problem for G ♮ with the partitioning Low = Σ o , Down = Σ d and High = {h}, and we show that ϕ is opaque for L w.r.
It has first to be noted that, by construction, for any q ∈ Q d ,
and second, that for any q ∈ F ϕ , (q, 1) ∈ Q ♮ d since the only transition going into these states is an h-transition. Hence,
Also, ϕ is opaque for L w.r.t.
Finally, we define a reverse reduction extending a similar reduction defined in [2] from NI to opacity w.r.t. natural projection.
Theorem 5. INI verification for finite systems is reducible to opacity verification of regular secrets w.r.t. π Low,Down for regular languages.
Proof. Let G = (Σ, Q, δ, q 0 ) be a transition system with 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the opacity verification problem in the context of finite systems, regular secrets and a class of Orwellian observation functions that we called Orwellian projections. As an illustration of the relevancy of this problem in the context of the verification of information flow properties in the domain of security-critical systems, we have related opacity w.r.t. Orwellian projections to INI for finite systems by showing a computational equivalence between both notions, providing , as a side effect a characterization of NI for finite systems with opacity of regular secrets w.r.t. natural projections for regular languages.
We are now investigating the opacity synthesis problem consisting of compute the supremal opaque sublanguage w.r.t. Orwellian projection of a given language, and its dual problem, which is also very challenging since, in this case, there is a large range of modifications to the initial system that can be considered, e.g., enlarging the behavior of the non-secret part inserting suitable downgrading actions whenever possible or cutting some possible secret behaviors. In future works, we will investigate the problem of supervisory control for opacity w.r.t. Orwellian projections along a line of research initiated by [16] for opacity w.r.t. natural projections. We also plan to instantiate opacity to Intransitive Non-interference with Selective Declassification (INISD) which has been suggested recently in [15] . INISD generalises INI by allowing to each downgrading action d to declassify only a subset H(d) of non-observable events, which is more likely to be of practical interest. A structural definition of this property for Petri nets has been proposed and its decidability has been investigated in [17] .
